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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMM'N v. PENNINGTON: AN 
ATTORNEY'S RELIANCE ON ADVICE OF COUNSEL IS NOT 
A DEFENSE TO A VIOLATION OF THE MARYLAND RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
By: Ian Bartman 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held an attorney's reliance on 
advice of counsel is not a defense to a violation of the Maryland Rules 
of Professional Conduct. Attorney Grievance Comm 'n v. Pennington, 
387 Md. 565, 589, 876 A.2d 642, 656 (2005). In a case of first 
impression, the Court concluded that an attorney is presumed to know 
the rules of professional conduct, and relying on another attorney's 
advice regarding application of the rules to a particular situation does 
not eliminate liability for misconduct. !d. at 589-90, 876 A.2d at 656. 
Denise Haynes-Butler ("Butler") sustained mJunes as a 
consequence of a motor vehicle accident. Jointly with her husband, 
she retained Jill Johnson Pennington ("Pennington"), a Maryland 
attorney, to pursue their claims against the other driver and his 
insurance company Arnica Mutual Insurance Company ("Arnica"). 
Two months before the statute of limitations tolled for the claim, 
Pennington filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George's 
County, but the clerk's office made a clerical mistake and had no 
record of the complaint having been properly filed and docketed. 
Pennington did not discover the error until she received a letter from 
Arnica more than two months after she filed the complaint seeking 
verification of the filing date. Upon learning of the error, she 
contacted the clerk's office to determine how to correct the error and 
was advised to submit the file stamped copy of her complaint and 
cancelled check for the filing fee. It was at that time Pennington 
became aware that the check for the filing fees was never negotiated 
by the clerk's office. By then, the statute oflimitations had expired on 
the claim. Without advising or consulting the Butlers, Pennington 
made an agreement with Arnica's attorney to dismiss the action with 
prejudice. 
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Pennington chose to conceal the dismissal from the Butlers and pay 
them out of her own funds disguised as a settlement from the opposing 
parties. She then sought advice regarding the matter from a previous 
colleague and friend, N. Frank Wiggins, Esquire ("Wiggins"). 
Specifically, she sought reassurance that her payment to the Butlers 
and the nondisclosure of the facts would not violate the law or rules of 
ethical conduct in Maryland. After researching the matter, Wiggins 
incorrectly advised Pennington that disclosure to the clients was 
unnecessary. Pennington then presented payment to the Butlers in the 
form of a settlement agreement. 
As a result of Pennington's actions, Arnica brought this matter 
before the Attorney Grievance Commission ("Commission"), who 
subsequently filed a petition with the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
alleging violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The Court of Appeals referred the matter to the Circuit Court for 
Prince George's County for findings of fact and proposed conclusions 
oflaw. 
The trial court concluded that Pennington violated seven separate 
rules of professional conduct. Having found no Maryland case law for 
which good faith reliance on advice of counsel was an affirmative 
defense in an attorney's disciplinary action, the court ruled that 
Pennington was prevented from relying on that defense in this case. 
However, part of the court's ruling permitted Pennington's good faith 
reliance on the advice of counsel to be taken into account as a 
mitigating factor when fashioning a sanction. The trial court 
recommended suspending Pennington for 120 days and placing her on 
a probationary period under the guidance of a capable lawyer with 
strong administrative skills. 
Both parties then filed exceptions with the Court of Appeals. 
Pennington excepted to all of the trial court's findings. The 
Commission excepted to the court's conclusion that Pennington's 
reliance on Wiggins' advice was in good faith and should be used as a 
mitigating factor when fashioning her sanction. On appeal, the Court 
of Appeals used the clearly erroneous standard of review to examine 
the hearing judge's findings of fact and the de novo standard to review 
the hearing judge's conclusions oflaw. /d. at 586, 876 A.2d at 654. 
At the Court of Appeals, Pennington's overarching defense was her 
reliance on the advice of counsel. /d. Recognizing this issue as one of 
first impression, the Court looked to the attorney grievance case of 
Attorney Grievance Comm 'n v. Gregory, 311 Md. 522, 536 A.2d 646 
(1988) for guidance. /d. In Gregory, an attorney relied upon a formal 
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ethics opinion of the Maryland State Bar Association, and although the 
Court found the Bar Association's opinion to be advisory and not 
binding, it may be a factor considered in the filing of a grievance. ld. 
at 586-87, 876 A.2d 654-55. 
The Court also acknowledged that Maryland law recognizes the 
defense of reliance on counsel in some situations, such as fraud as it 
relates to scienter, tax cases, and specific intent crimes. Id. at 587, 876 
A.2d at 655. 
Next, the Court referred to a Colorado case analogous to 
Pennington, People v. Katz, 58 P.3d 1176 (Col. 2002). Id. at 589, 876 
A.2d at 656. In Katz, a reliance-on-the-advice-of-counsel defense was 
raised by Katz, an attorney, in a disciplinary matter regarding a 
violation of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. ld. Katz 
withdrew funds from a joint account without the knowledge or consent 
of a firm with whom he collaborated in reliance on advice of counsel 
who stated he could withdraw the funds in question. ld. As a result of 
Katz's actions, the Colorado Supreme Court disbarred him and 
rejected his defense because, presumably, Katz understood the rules of 
professional conduct and he could not delegate that responsibility to 
another by seeking the advice of counsel. ld. Furthermore, the facts 
of that case established that Katz withheld material information from 
the advising attorney during the discussion when the legal advice was 
provided. Id. 
Adopting the Katz decision as a basis for its rationale in 
Pennington; the Court held that Pennington's reliance on advice from 
Wiggins was not a defense to her violations of the rules of professional 
conduct, or any of her conduct in this case. I d. at 589-90, 876 A.2d at 
656. The Court stressed that Pennington was a member of the Bar of 
Maryland and took an oath to comply with the rules of professional 
conduct and to act in conformity with those standards. Id. The Court 
of Appeals also took into account the trial court's findings by clear and 
convincing evidence that Pennington did not disclose the dismissal or 
communicate the source of funds to the Butlers and presented a 
settlement sheet that could only have created an impression that the 
case had settled. ld. at 590, 876 A.2d at 656. The Court stated that 
"[ e ]very lawyer in this State should know that the misrepresentation to 
the client that occurred in this case [Pennington] was a violation of the 
Rules." Id. 
The Court commented that even if the reliance-on-the-advice-of-
counsel defense was applicable generally to attorney discipline 
matters, Pennington's attempt to raise that defense here would still fail 
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because she did not meet the requirements for asserting the defense. 
!d. at 590, 876 A.2d at 656-57. First, Pennington's misrepresentation 
to the Butlers and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice 
did not require specific intent. !d. Second, given her deceitful 
conduct and that she consulted a lawyer not admitted to practice in 
Maryland; Pennington could not have believed in good faith that her 
conduct was proper. !d. Finally, she did not make a full and honest 
disclosure of all material facts within her knowledge to Wiggins. !d. 
Ultimately, the Court, in ruling against Pennington, held that she 
clearly violated five out of the seven rules of conduct as alleged by the 
Commission. !d. at 596, 876 A.2d at 660. Guided by the interest of 
protecting the public and the public's confidence in the legal 
profession, the Court determined disbarment as an appropriate 
sanction, given Pennington's misrepresentations and deceitful conduct 
in conceding the truth. !d. at 595-96, 876 A.2d at 660. 
The Court of Appeals' opinion in Pennington sends a message to 
attorneys in Maryland that every lawyer is presumed to know and 
abide by the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct. Therefore, 
accountability is placed solely on the attorney for any violation of 
these rules. The decision to disbar Pennington was clearly an attempt 
to protect the public from the intentional dishonesty of an attorney and 
put other attorneys on notice of the type of misconduct that will not be 
tolerated by the Court. 
